

Lesson 14

A guide to mobile security



Mobile Security Survival | Internet at Liberty 2012 @safermobile | www.safermobile.org

Understand how mobile phones work

Learn about mobile phone risk

Improve your mobile security

Know where to go for more

Mobile communications are far less secure than the Internet but are relied upon more by activists, organizers, and journalists.

Mobile technology is increasingly used as an attack vector by repressive regimes.

Even tech-savvy individuals are extremely underprepared to deal with new mobile threats. So, how do we protect ourselves?

Mobile Networks

How do they work?



The Network: SIM Card

The SIM card has a unique number - the **IMSI** - that is stored as a 64-bit field in the SIM inside the phone and is sent by the phone to the network.



The Network: Handset

Your handset has a unique number, the IMEI



The Network: Cell Tower

Cell towers relay information from your phone to the Mobile Network Operator (MNO)



The Network: Cell Towers

Cell towers "triangulate" your location and relay data to/from your phone



The Network: Transmitting Information



The Network:

Mobile Network Operators (MNOs):

- ✓ Sells you a SIM card✓ Owns or leases cell towers
- ✓ Relays data to/from your phone
 ✓ Stores your data (call logs, SMSs, triangulation)
- ✓ Charges you

What is a vulnerability?

A weakness in the process of communicating with your mobile device that can be exploited by others.

Your phone holds lots of data about you:

- ✓ Contacts
- ✓ SMSs
- ✓ Pictures and Video
- ✓ Emails
- ✓ Account information

What Does an Adversary Know?

- ✓ Where you are
- ✓ Who you are
- ✓ Who you talk to
- ✓ What you say

Threats: Surveillance




A quick demo

Threat: Shutdown



Threat: SMS Filtering



Threat: Location Tracking




Risk

Risk = Probability of a Threat Targeting a Vulnerability

Risk

Likelihood that someone will take advantage of Vulnerabilities



What do I do now??

Threat Mitigation

Threat Mitigation for mobile phones Legend



Don'ts



Do's



Smartphone specific (any brand)

Threat: Shutdown



Shutdown Some Mitigation Tactics

| If a network shutdown is possible, make sure you have alternate communications | X | Don't assume that phones will be working when you get to a protest |
|--|---|--|
| and coordinations plans. | 1 | Set up meeting places in advance in case of network |
| | 1 | shutdown Exchange land line numbers with your close network |

Threat: You are identified

Case Study - Syria

The Syrian government has reportedly sentenced a citizen journalist to death after he gave a series of interviews to Al-Jazeera. Mohammed Abdelmawla al-Hariri was found guilty of "high treason and contacts with foreign parties".

Identification Who are you?

| Make sure they cannot be liked to your ldentity. All mobile actions and moves are traceable. | | Keep SIM anonymous (pay in cash, don't give personal details, change SIM often) |
|--|---|---|
| tradeable. | 1 | Use foreign SIMs, but with caution. |
| | 1 | Don't give real name or address on phone or via SMS. |

Identification Who did you talk to?

| If opponent access to the network operator: | 1 | Have everybody use anonymous SIMs |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | Use more than one phone and SIM |
| | | Use smartphones for secure internet calls |
| To deter a 'random person'*: | 1 | Clear Call logs |

Identification Who else is in your network?

| Network operator | X | Don't swap and reuse phones and anonymous SIMs in your network |
|---------------------|---|--|
| | 1 | Store sensitive contacts on paper, scrambled |
| Random person | | Purge socialmedia apps Never store passwords |

Surveillance What did you say?

| If surveillance is a threat, practice countersurveillance | X | Don't communicate sensitive information over mobile networks. |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | Use secure Internet based voice services |
| | 1 | Use code language |

Phone as Bug What is going on around you?

| Phone as Bug what is going on around you? | | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| If you fear constant surveillance, then | ~ | Don't lend your phone or accept phone as a gift | |
| consider your | | accept priorie as a girt | |
| phone as the perfect bug | 1 | Lock your phone well | |
| | 1 | Take out batteries & put in noisy place during sensitive meetings | |
| | | Know your apps! | |

Tracking: Where are you, Where were you?

| Make it harder for your adversaries to | X | Don't keep your phone |
|--|---|--|
| track your movements. | | on and with you all day |
| | 1 | Take your phone battery out before traveling to sensitive meetings |
| | 1 | Use more than one phone |
| | | Disable Location service and remove GPS antenna |

Seizure What were you doing?

| Make it harder for your adversaries to track your movements. | X | Don't keep your phone on and with you all day |
|--|---|--|
| | | Take your phone battery out before traveling to sensitive meetings |
| | 1 | Use more than one phone |
| | | Disable Location service and remove GPS antenna |

Seizure What were you doing?

| Make it harder for a random person to see your data | X | Don't store sensitive data, photos, passwords |
|---|---|--|
| | 1 | Use a strong passcode |
| | 1 | Delete logs, data ASAP |
| | | Prepare remote or panic Wipe |
| | | Encrypt your phone |

Seizure What were you doing?

| Mobile phones have very low security standards. Forensics can | 8 | Most passcodes can be unlocked |
|---|---|---|
| recover pretty much everything | P | Deleted data may still be present |
| | | Overwritten files may still be present |
| | | Most encryption mechanisms are flawed |

Seizure What were you doing?

| Mobile phones have very low security standards. | X | Don't store sensitive data, photos, passwords |
|---|---|---|
| Forensics can recover pretty much everything | 1 | Only wiped encrypted data is safe |

Threat: Remote Information Theft

On the Internet, Smartphone are just computers....with fewer defenses

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